Bioethicists involved in end‐of‐life debates routinely distinguish between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’. Meanwhile, previous work in cognitive science has revealed that when people characterize behaviour as either actively ‘doing’ or passively ‘allowing’, they do so not purely on descriptive grounds, but also as a function of the behaviour’s perceived morality. In the present report, we extend this line of research by examining how medical students and professionals (N = 184) and laypeople (N = 122) describe physicians’ behaviour in end‐of‐life scenarios. (...) We show that the distinction between ‘ending’ a patient’s life and ‘allowing’ it to end arises from morally motivated causal selection. That is, when a patient wishes to die, her illness is treated as the cause of death and the doctor is seen as merely allowing her life to end. In contrast, when a patient does not wish to die, the doctor’s behaviour is treated as the cause of death and, consequently, the doctor is described as ending the patient’s life. This effect emerged regardless of whether the doctor’s behaviour was omissive (as in withholding treatment) or commissive (as in applying a lethal injection). In other words, patient consent shapes causal selection in end‐of‐life situations, and in turn determines whether physicians are seen as ‘killing’ patients, or merely as ‘enabling’ their death. (shrink)

When discussing genetic prenatal enhancement, we often encounter objections related to “eugenics.” Those who want to defend prenatal enhancement either try to avoid using the term “eugenics” or talk about “liberal eugenics”, implying that what was wrong with the old eugenics was its coercive character, and claiming that while old eugenics went against reproductive freedom, the new liberal eugenics promotes freedom. In this paper we first explore the objection that genetic enhancement is a form of eugenics that limits parental freedom. (...) We then show how the same objection appears in other bioethical debates. Finally, we answer the objection, showing that genetic enhancement does not limit reproductive freedom in any important sense. (shrink)

Human beings have been spending a lot of time in front of a screen for many years. Through the computer and other electronic devices, we interact with our friends and colleagues, we maintain contact with our relatives, we carry out part of our work, we study and we carry out leisure activities. Despite the many advantages that all this has brought to our lives, ethical and social problems have also arisen. Although these electronic devices have become increasingly immersive and interactive, (...) virtual reality seems to present a qualitative leap. In this chapter we will analyse how big this jump is, we will review the ethical problems that may appear, we will ask ourselves if they are really new and we will study how and to what extent we can face them. (shrink)

The current anti-doping policy in sports has enormous costs in economic, social, and human terms. As these costs are likely to become even bigger with the advent of bioenhancing technologies, in this paper I analyze the reasons for this policy. In order to clarify this issue, I compare sports with dance, an activity that has many similarities with sports but where there are no bans on performance enhancers. Considering the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) criteria for banning a substance, we argue (...) that two of them, the potential to enhance performance and the risk for health, are similar in dance and sports, thus I claim that the difference had to be in the so-called “spirit” of sports and dance. After looking into this matter and analyzing the special case of dancesport, I conclude that the main difference can be found in the competitive character of sports and the subsequent concern about competitive justice. (shrink)

Una de las críticas más habituales contra el utilitarismo consiste en señalar su incapacidad para reconocer la relevancia moral de la distinción entre acciones y omisiones. Según esta crítica, afirmar la irrelevancia de esta distinción 1) va en contra de las intuiciones del sentido común, 2) elimina la diferencia entre lo obligatorio y lo meritorio y 3) hace inviable la propuesta utilitarista, al proponer una moral demasiado exigente. En este trabajo nos centraremos en el segundo aspecto de esta crítica, y (...) defenderemos que el utilitarismo sí dispone de los medios para distinguir entre lo obligatorio y lo meritorio. Asimismo, defenderemos que l utilitarismo no necesita renunciar a afirmar la irrelevancia moral de la distinción entre acciones y omisiones para responder adecuadamente a esas críticas. Para ello, nos valdremos fundamentalmente del análisis ofrecido por John S. Mill en el capítulo cinco de su obra Utilitarismo, en el que a nuestro juicio puede encontrase la versión clásica de la respuesta a esta crítica, que de una u otra manera los utilitaristas contemporáneos han asumido y desarrollado. (shrink)

Este trabajo versa sobre la aplicación del principio de precaución a un caso concreto: los organismos modificados genéticamente (OMG). Está estructurado del modo siguiente. En primer lugar, nos centramos en los OMG, intentando aclarar el significado de los términos “organismo modificado genéticamente” y “transgénico”, ofreciendo un breve recorrido por su historia y dibujando a grandes rasgos los riesgos y beneficios que pueden procurar. A continuación, nos ocupamos del tratamiento de los OMG en algunas de las regulaciones principales en las que (...) se apela al principio de precaución y las distintas opiniones que críticos y defensores de la nueva tecnología tienen sobre su aplicación. Tras argumentar que la diversidad de opiniones se debe, al menos en parte, a la ambigüedad del propio principio, analizamos las diversas variantes en las que este se presenta. Para concluir, intentamos establecer qué tipo de precaución resulta adecuada en el caso de los OMG. (shrink)

Throughout History, several arguments have been presented to support that though there are multiple intermediate ends, there is a single ultimate end. In this paper, we analyse the two possible lines of argument, one formal and the other of substantive nature. Both originate in Aristotle, but neither of them are conclusive in my opinion.

Apoyándose en la Teoría de la Elección Racional y en el contractualismo, Gauthier intenta derivar la moralidad como una restricción en la maximización de la utilidad justificada por la razón a partir de una situación y unos agentes moralmente neutrales. El mantenimiento de los acuerdos satisfactorios sería racionalmente justificable incluso en ausencia de restricciones externas. En este artículo analizamos la argumentación ofrecida por Gauthier en apoyo de su contractualismo moral y defendemos que, en determinadas situaciones, los acuerdos cuyo cumplimiento apoya (...) la razón son, siguiendo a Hobbes, los apoyados por restricciones externas. From Contractualism and the Theory of Rational Choice, Gauthier attempts to infer morality as a rationally justified restriction of utility maximization when considering a situation involving morally neutral agents. Even in absence of external constraints, satisfactory agreements should be kept for a purely rational justification. In this paper, we analyze the reasons offered by Gauthier in favor of a moral contractarianism and, following Hobbes, defend that in particular situations the agreements sustained by reason are those that are also sustained by external constraints. (shrink)

In liberal societies, we generally admit the principle of Procreative Liberty (PL) that, though usually defended with no explicit reference to Mill’s Harm Principle (HP), is perfectly coherent with it. It comprises several liberties, such as the liberty to decide when, how many times, with whom and if to procreate at all. On the other hand, we talk about the principle of Parental Autonomy (PA) or Parental Liberty: the parents have the right to raise their children and to make all (...) decisions concerning them free from governmental intervention. Whatever the scope defended for this right, we usually admit that it has more limits than PL. The reason is clear enough: there is a third party involved, the child, and, according to Mill’s HP, the society can rightfully intervene. Though traditionally procreative and parental rights have been considered as independent rights, and though PL and PA have been defended on different basis, in this paper I want to argue that some proposed extensions of PL are best considered as cases of PA. (shrink)

Utilitarianism and democracy had always been related, to the point that for same authors democracy is nothing but political utilitarianism. Though his claim can be challenged, utilitarians had always supported democracy. However, their main arguments and proposals had been remarkably different. In this paper we analyze these differences in terms both of the intrinsic differences in their theoretical proposals and of the changing historical and political context.